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REGULATORY CHANGE: A STEP IN
THE RIGHT DIRECTION
STEPHENJ. FRIEDMAN
Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
The Equitable Financial Companies
New York, New York

Congress is currently validating change that has already occurred.
However, there are very important questions of structure that remain.
The most important question, I think, is the reality of firewalls. I believe
in firewalls, but as both a lawyer and a regulator I have a healthy respect
for their limitations. I have some concerns about their efficacy, born
largely of my personal experience in coming to Baldwin United when the
walls began to crumble and the company began to fail. In a confidence
business, which is the business all financial institutions are in, it is very
difficult to control the effect of adverse events anywhere in the system.
Containment of damage is possible, but there is reason to proceed
carefully and to assess the effects of our experience as we go along. We
must gauge the effects of the condition of Texas banks on public
confidence, and the effects of Continental Illinois. We have to learn from
those lessons.
The pace of change is extremely important. Congressman Barnard is
surely right: we ought not be afraid of change. In fact, in this area it does
not do any good to be afraid of change because change happens anyway.
The markets change, institutions change, and financial institutions and
instruments change. The real issue is never whether change is going to
take place, but whether the regulators, the Congress, and public
policymaking are in the driver's seat when change happens. Historically,
'See, e.g. , Hayes, Even Strong Suffer in State Thrift Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 18,
1987, at D l , col. 3; Klott, Nearly $1 Billion of U . S . Aid Averts Texas Bank's Fall,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1987, at D l , col. 1 (on the worsening situation of the
Texas thrift industry and the most notable recent bank failure in Texas). See also
Inquiry Into Continental Illinois Carp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supemision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 300
(1984) (on the Continental Illinois failure generally).
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they have not been in the driver's seat. In effect, legislative and regulatory
action is the conservative course here.
The interrelationship among financial markets is so complex that it is
virtually impossible to predict the results of change. There are dramatic
examples of acting that appeared to be very small changes. There is
probably no better example than Rule 415.2 I was a Securities and
Exchange Commission Commissioner when Rule 415 was adopted. I
remember very clearly the staff saying that Rule 415 was a technical
change designed to permit issuers access to markets even more quickly
than the two or three days that the improved procedures then ~ e r m i t t e d . ~
At that time, we were still in a period of extremely volatile interest rates.
As it turned out, Rule 415 absolutely revolutionized the securities
industry. It led to a degree of concentration in the underwriting of debt
securities that no one had imagined.
Money market funds are another example of dramatic change. The
invention of money market funds revolutionized the banking business. It
was the primary engine of disintermediation in the 1970s and, more
importantly, it had a dramatic effect on the relationship of depositors to
financial institution^.^ I remember very clearly a banker saying to me,
"Never in our wildest dreams did we imagine that people would take their
life savings and put them in an envelope and send them off in the mail to
someone they had never met." But that is the nature of banking today.
While change is important, in addition to a measured pace of change,
affirmative action and legislative action are also very important. The real
challenges do not lie in the area of new banking powers. If you go back
and look at the new powers, it is hard to imagine what all the excitement
was about. The new powers include distributing mutual funds,
underwriting revenue bonds, and underwriting corporate debt.5 There is
virtually no risk in underwriting mutual funds. Have you ever heard of a
security firm that failed-or almost failed-because it underwrote mutual
217 C.F.R. $ 230.415 (1988) (allowing certain securities to be registered for
an offering to be made on a continuous or delayed basis, provided the
registration statement meets certain requirements).
3E.g., SEC's Spencer Analytes Rule 415, Doubts Many Innovations Under Shelf
OfferingRule, Vol. 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 903 (May 21, 1982).
4See T. Cook & J. Duffield, Monty Market Mutual Funds and Other Short-Term
Investment Pools in Instruments of the Money Market, in INSTRUMENTS
I N THE
MONEYMARKET159-64 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond 6th ed. 1986).
5See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 108, 134 CONG.REC.S3520 (daily ed.
Mar. 31, 1988).
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funds? Second, banks already underwrite many kinds of revenue bonds.
Third, what banks do everyday is parallel to underwriting corporate debt,
but much riskier because they retain the debt on their books. Therefore, it
is hard to imagine a n intellectually respectable argument that
underwriting corporate debt is a dangerous activity for banks. The same
is true of underwriting equities. I used to believe that banking had
become a riskier business than the securities business, but the events of
October 19, 1987 have given everyone pause.6
With regard to the market crash, it is significant that there was no
major failure by any securities firm in the face of a very dramatic loss in
value and enormous strains on the system. At the same time, there is a lot
that needs fixing. Anyone who went through that period can pinpoint
areas of extreme danger in which, had things gone in a slightly different
way, there would have been enormous stresses on the system. But those
were stresses for the financial system as a whole, not for individual
securities firms.
In short, I believe that the real challenges to banking regulation are in
the area of traditional banking activities. Over the past ten years, while all
of the legislative effort and the debate has been focused on the GlassSteagall Act and securities powers-and more recently on insurance
powers-dramatic
changes have been taking place in traditional
banking.' These changes have significantly increased the risk in the
banking system. For example, there has been a very curious and largely
unexamined series of excesses in traditional lending over the last ten or
fifteen years: excessive lending to the real estate industry in the early
1970s, lending to less developed countries, petrodollar lending, and
lending to the oil patch.8
In a sense, the problems of the savings and loan industry are really
another aspect of this problem of excess. Occasionally one sees newspaper
articles that attribute the problems of savings and loans to the

6The Crash of '87: Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J . , Oct. 20,
1987, at 1, col. 5.
'See generally ADRIANHAMILTON,THEFINANCIAL
REVOLUTION(1986).
8See Berg, Banks Study Strategy to Replenish Reserves, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1987, at D l , col. 1; Schmitt and Hill, Banks to Post Record $10 Billion Loss for 2nd
Quarter: Industries Foreign-Debt Reserve Additions are Exceediy Forecasts, Wall St. J .,
July 20, 1987, at 2, col. 2; Berg, Mediocre Quarter For Banks, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1987, at D5, col. 1; Nash, U . S . Banks' Profit Drop Linked to Brazil Loans, N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1987, at D5, col. 5.
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deregulation of asset powers.g In my view that is a wrong-headed position
to take. In the early 1980s, the savings and loan industry was in a crisis
because of volatility of interest rates a n d inflation, r a m p a n t
disintermediation, short-term liabilities, and long-term fixed-rate assets.
They were simply unable to cope with the financial facts of their
existence. The deregulation providing for more flexible asset powers was a
response to that.1° How savings and loans used those powers, and how
their use was regulated, are quite different questions. The whole area has
been inadequately explored and is certainly inadequately understood.
There has been an increasing disparity in the mix of assets of different
kinds of banks, large and small, that is making the traditional ways of
regulating those banks obsolete. There is probably no better example
than the new capital rules." There is general agreement that the new
capital rules are important. Indeed, they are one of the more impressive
regulatory accomplishments of the past decade. But the notion of treating
all assets of a given kind-all loans for example-in the same way is
deeply flawed. It illustrates the limits of regulation. How is it possible for a
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, or the FDIC, to
develop rules that apply to the rich diversity and complexity of our
banking system? Those capital rules may be as good as they can be, but
they are still not adequate for the range of risks and challenges that the
banking system poses. Fundamental questions have been raised in the last
few years about the role of deposit insurance in this environment; for
example, the possibility of risk-based deposit insurance has been
explored.12 These questions go deeply to the nature of the risks that are
individual to particular banks.
-

-

gSee, e.g., McCoy, Financial Fraud: Theories Behind Nationwide Surge in Bank
Swindles, Wall St. J . , Oct. 2, 1987, at 23, col. 3.
1°Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97320, 96 Stat. 1496 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see
also GAO Issues Report on Condition of S&L Industry from 1977 through June 1987, 50
Banking Rep. (BNA) 858 (May 23, 1988).
"See Virtually Identical Risk-Based Capital Proposals Issued for Comment by
Agencies, 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 382 (Mar. 7, 1988). Since the time of Mr.
Friedman's speech the Basle Committee has also released its risk-based
standards. See Basle Committee Issues Final Risk-Based Capital Standards, 51 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 135 (July 25, 1988); Final International Risk-Based Capital Standards
Adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 143
(July 25, 1988) (text of Basle Committee's final accord).
12See, e.g., Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House o f Representatives Committee on Government
Operations (Part 3), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 390-463 (1987) [hereinafter Structure and
Regulation] (testimony by Thomas F. Huertas and Rachel Strauber, Analysis of
Alternative Proposalsfor Deposit Insurance Rtjorm).
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A few years ago, Tamar Frankel, a faculty member of the Boston
University School of Law, and I developed an idea that would model
capital rules on the approach chosen by the Congress in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.13 The Act imposed a heavy burden on the board of
directors of a company to develop systems of internal controls that were
appropriate for that company. This led to a mini-industry that grew in the
accounting firms, which developed and tailored packages of internal
controls that were appropriate for particular companies. This is a possible
approach. There may be others, but some fundamental rethinking has to
be done in this area.
There is significant increased risk in the banking system. The public
markets, particularly the commercial paper markets in the short-term,
and the debt markets in the longer term, have taken away the highest
credits from the banking system. l4 The maturities of loans have increased
progressively.15 Thus, what we have are higher risk, longer term loans
that have changed the kind of risk a bank takes. Banks have begun to
respond to that through the development of securitization, which poses
the risk as to investors.
Certainly since the early 1970s there has been increased volatility in
all our markets.16 Traditional bank trading activities, trading government
bonds and currencies, represent a level of great magnitude of risk in
trading. Some of you may have noticed that last year's Banker's Trust Fourth
Quarter Report showed very high profits that were due to currency trading
activities. l7That is wholly different from the level of risk assumed by most
securities firms in trading for the accounts of their customers.18
Globalization is discussed a great deal. However, few people
understand the extent of the impact of globalization. A former senior staff
I3Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2 13, tit. I, 91 Stat.
1494-98 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U .S.C .).
I4See Structure and Regulation, supra note 12, at 247-92 (testimony by Thomas
F. Huertas and Rachel Strauber, Competitive Environment Facing Banks).
I5See G. HEMPEL,A. COLEMAN& D. GIMONSON,BANKMANAGEMENT
TEXTAND CASES28-30 (2d ed. 1986).
I6See, e.g., S.P. Feinstein, Stock Market Volatilip, in ECON. REV.42 (Fed.
17
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Nov./Dec. 1987); Capital Markets, ECON. TRENDS
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland Mar. 1987).
"See Hill and Guether, Major Banks Found Post-Crash Turmoil To Yield Bonanza
in Foreign Exchange, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
I8E.g., Stevens, Big Bank Gain from Trading in Currencies, Wall St. J., May 4,
1987, at 44, col. 1; Stevens, Currency Trades Again Aid Bank Results: Concerned
Analysts Cite Earnings Volatility, Wall St. J . , July 27, 1987, at 25, col. 1.
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officer at the Federal Reserve said at a meeting the other day that he
believes there is no academic exposition anywhere that describes, in a
reasonable and accurate way, global securities markets. During the two
weeks after October 19, 1987, there was a n extraordinary linkage between
international markets-between the markets in London, New York, and
Tokyo.lg There is no particular reason why there should be such a
linkage. Each of those equity markets is based in a different economy with
different strengths and different economic forces, but the linkage was very
direct. What is the significance of that? Why did it happen? What are its
implications? The fact is that when the markets are broader than the
reach of the regulator, regulation is fundamentally impossible and the
potential for abuse is enormous.
In addition, I would simply sound a note on the limits of regulation. I
think it is significant that there is a linkage between the nature and extent
of regulation and the degree of flexibility that you give to market
participants. The willingness of the society and the Congress to tolerate
abuse is a key variable. If we are unable to tolerate abuse and our
objective is to avoid problems, we inevitably end up with a highly
coercive, highly inflexible set of regulations. The two most successful
examples of financial regulation, in the sense of avoiding problems, are
the Investment Company Act and New York's Insurance Regulation in
the twentieth century.20 They are also the two most inflexible, most
difficult, regulatory regimes. They have also proved to be the most
inappropriate for this environment. If regulation does not go in that
direction-and I think it would be a dreadful mistake to do so-if we opt
for flexibility, then some degree of abuse, and of failure, is inevitable.
This places a new emphasis on enforcement. In the securities business,
where flexibility has been very important and the Securities and Exchange
Commission has been loath to interfere with innovation, there has been
very heavy reliance on enforcement as a means of controlling improper

lgSee, e.g., Share Prices Plunge Across Asia, Europe as U.S. Decline Stuns Equities
Markets, Wall St. J . , Oct. 20, 1987, at 50, col. 1; Stock Prices Fall Across Asia and
Europe as Decline of Dollar Weighs on Markets, Wall St. J . , Oct. 29, 1987, at 48, col.
1; Share Prices Drop on Most Exchanges on Anxiety About Dollar, U.S. Policy, Wall St.
J . , Nov. 10, 1987, at 54, col. 1.
201nvestment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789, $$ 1-53
(codified at 15 U.S.C. $5 80a-1 - 80a-52); see Nathan F. Jones, Comparison ofstate
Insurance and Federal Securities Requirements, INSURANCEPRODUCTSUNDERTHE
SECURITIESLAWS121 (Practising Law Institute 452 (1984)).
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behavi~r.~
Although
'
there are indications that this approach is beginning
to be taken in banking regulation, further evolution toward more vigorous
enforcement would be a very new development.
Lastly, and related to the limits of regulation, it is important to
recognize that regulating financial institutions is a very tough business.
These are complex markets. Watch the activity on the floor of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, which, I am told, has more math PhDs than
Northwestern University. You will see, immediately, how far ahead of the
regulators they are. That is true in every financial industry. It is just more
palpable in Chicago.
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